**Fine-grained argument and conceptualism of perception**

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Abstract

Since the publication of McDowell’s Mind and World (MW), the issue of the nature of perceptual content has become a subject of hot debate in philosophy of mind and epistemology. A main concern of the issue is on the question whether the content of a perceptual experience is exclusively conceptual, just like what is typically ascribed to beliefs and judgments. Conceptualism is under severe attacks from various concerns, but two most discussed, and perhaps most commonsensically-supported, ones are the fine-grained argument and the animal/infant argument. As a result, few remain a conceptualist nowadays. Nonetheless, here I demonstrate that the two arguments fail to undermine the conceptuality of perceptual content. My main point is that if one can see the intelligibility of the conceptualness of the world, one can make intelligible the conceptualness of experience. The major implication of our exploration is then that the core issue underlying the perceptual conceptualness debate should be the conceptualness of the world.

My arguments draw heavily on resources from McDowell’s thoughts on experience in his MW, especially, the Wittgensteinean idea embodied in the following identity claim: “there is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or generally the sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing that can be the case.” (MW: 27). I will argue that the identity claim can be extended to perceptual content such that we may say: there is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can think, the sort of thing one can perceive, and the sort of thing that can be the case. The idea is that how things perceptually appear to us can also be the content of a judgment, which also can be a state of the world.